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Abstract
In this paper we introduce a qualitative de-
cision and game theory based on belief (B)
and desire (D) rules. We show that a group
of agents acts as if it is maximizing achieved
joint goals.
1 Introduction
One of the main problems in agent theory is the dis-
tinction between formal theories and tools developed
for individual autonomous agents, and theories and
tools developed for multi agent systems. In the so-
cial sciences, this distinction is called the micro-macro
dichotomy. The prototypical example is the distinc-
tion between classical decision theory based on the
expected utility paradigm (usually identified with the
work of Neumann and Morgenstern [15] and Savage
[11]) and classical game theory (such as the work
of Nash and more recently the work of Axelrod).
Whereas classical decision theory is a kind of opti-
mization problem (maximizing the agent’s expected
utility), classical game theory is a kind of equilibria
analysis.
There are several approaches in practical reasoning
(within philosophy), cognitive science and artificial in-
telligence to bring the micro and macro description
together. The basic idea is two-fold:
1. The decision making of individual autonomous
agents is described in terms of other concepts than
maximizing utility. For example, since the early
40s there is a distinction between classical decision
theory and artificial intelligence based on utility
aspiration levels and goal based planning (as pi-
oneered by Simon [12]). Cognitive theories are
typically based on vague concepts from folk psy-
chology like beliefs, desires and intentions.
2. The decision making of a group or society of
agents is described in terms of concepts gener-
alized from those used for individual agents, such
as joint goals, joint intentions, joint commitments,
etc. Moreover, also new concepts are introduced
at this social level, such as norms (a central con-
cept in most social theories).
It is still an open problem how the micro-macro di-
chotomy of classical decision and game theory is re-
lated to the micro-macro dichotomy of these alter-
native theories. Has or can the micro and macro
level be brought together by replacing classical the-
ories by alternative theories? Before this question
can be answered, the relation between the classical
and alternative theories has to be clarified. Doyle
and Thomason [6] argue that classical decision theory
should be reunited with alternative decision theories
in so-called qualitative decision theory (QDT), which
studies qualitative versions of classical decision the-
ory, hybrid combinations of quantitative and qualita-
tive approaches to decision making, and decision mak-
ing in the context of artificial intelligence applications
such as planning, learning and collaboration. Quali-
tative decision theories have been developed based on
beliefs (probabilities) and desires (utilities) using for-
mal tools such as modal logic [2] and on utility func-
tions and knowledge [7]. More recently these beliefs-
desires models have been extended with intentions or
BDI models [5, 10].
In this paper we introduce a rule based qualitative de-
cision and game theory, based on belief (B) and desire
(D) rules. We call an individual autonomous agent
which minimizes its unreached desires a BD rational
agent. We define goals as a set of formulas which can
be derived by beliefs and desires in a certain way, such
that BD rational agents act as if they maximize the
set of achieved goals, and agents maximizing their sets
of achieved goals are BD rational. Moreover, groups of
agents which end up in equilibria act as if they maxi-
mize joint goals.
Like classical decision theory but in contrast to sev-
eral proposals in the BDI approach [5, 10], the theory
does not incorporate decision processes, temporal rea-
soning, and scheduling.
The layout of this paper is as follows. Section 2 de-
velops a qualitative logic of decision. This logic tells
us what the optimal decision is, but it does not tell us
how to find this optimal decision. Section 3 considers
the AI solution to this problem [12, 8]: break down the
decision problem into goal generation and goal based
decisions.
1.1 QDT and NMR
Qualitative decision theory is related to non-
monotonic logic (“qualitative”) and to reasoning about
uncertainty (“decision theory” formalizes decision
making under uncertainty). However, they are based
on different disciplines. According to a distinction
made by Aristotle, non-monotonic reasoning and rea-
soning about uncertainty formalize theoretical (or con-
clusion oriented) reasoning, whereas qualitative deci-
sion theory formalizes practical (or action oriented)
reasoning.
Thomason [13] observes that classical decision theory
neglects the issue of ‘correct inference’, and that the
absence of a logical theory of practical reasoning is
largely due to the unavailability of appropriate infer-
ence mechanisms. To handle even the simplest cases of
practical reasoning, it is essential to have a reasoning
mechanism that allows for practical conclusions that
are non-monotonic in the agent’s beliefs.
Where classical decision theory is based on probabil-
ities and utilities, qualitative decision theory is based
on beliefs and desires. In a modal approach, where
the beliefs and desires are represented by modalities
B and D respectively, and an action operator by the
modal operator Do, we may have for example that:
B(thirsty), D(drink) ⊢ Do(go− to− pub)
B(thirsty), D(drink), B(pub−closed) ⊢ Do(go−to−shop)
A drawback of such a modal logic approach is that on
the one hand modal logic is notorious for its problems
with formalizing conditionals or rules, and practical
reasoning on the other hand is usually seen as a kind
of rule based reasoning. In this paper we therefore do
not use modal logic but we use a rule based formalism.
2 A qualitative decision and game
theory
The qualitative decision and game theory introduced
in this section is based on sets of belief and desire rules.
We define an agent system specification, we show how
we can derive a game specification from it, and we give
some familiar notions from game theory such as Pareto
efficient decisions (choosing an optimal decision) and
Nash equilibria. First we consider the logic of rules we
adopt.
2.1 Logic of rules
The starting point of any theory of decision is a dis-
tinction between choices made by the decision maker
and choices imposed on it by its environment. For ex-
ample, a software upgrade agent (decision maker) may
have the choice to upgrade a computer system at a
particular time of the day. The software company (en-
vironment) may in turn allow/disallow such a upgrade
at a particular time. Let S = {α1, . . . , αn} be the so-
ciety or set of agents, then we therefore assume n dis-
joint sets of propositional atoms: A = A1 ∪ . . .∪An =
{a, b, c, . . .} (agents’ decision variables [7] or control-
lable propositions [2]) andW = {p, q, r, . . .} (the world
parameters or uncontrollable propositions). In the se-
quel we consider each decision maker as entities con-
sisting of defeasible rules. Such a decision maker gen-
erates its decisions by applying subsets of defeasible
rules to its input. This results in the so-called condi-
tional mental attitudes [4]. Before we proceed some
notations will be introduced.
• LAi , LW and LAW for the propositional languages
built up from these atoms in the usual way, and
variables x, y, . . . to stand for any sentences of
these languages.
• CnAi , CnW and CnAW for the consequence sets,
and |=Ai , |=W and |=AW for satisfiability, in any
of these propositional logics.
• x ⇒ y for an ordered pair of propositional sen-
tences called a rule.
• ER(T ) for the R extension of T , as defined in
Definition 1 below.
In our framework the generation of decisions are for-
malized based on the notion of extension. In particu-
lar, the decision of an agent, which is specified by a set
of defeasible rules R and has the input T , is the exten-
sion calculated based on R and T . This is formalized
in the following definition.
Definition 1 (Extension) Let R ⊆ LAW × LAW be
a set of rules and T ⊆ LAW be a set of sentences. The
consequents of the T -applicable rules are:
R(T ) = {y | x⇒ y ∈ R, x ∈ T }
and the R extension of T is the set of the consequents
of the iteratively T -applicable rules:
ER(T ) = ∩T⊆X,R(CnAW (X))⊆XX
We give some properties of the R extension of T in
Definition 1. First note that ER(T ) is not closed under
logical consequence. The following proposition shows
that ER(T ) is the smallest superset of T closed under
the rules R interpreted as inference rules.
Proposition 1 Let
• E0R(T ) = T
• EiR(T ) = E
i−1
R (T )∪R(CnAW (E
i−1
R (T ))) for i > 0
We have ER(T ) = ∪∞0 E
i
R(T ).
Usually, an decision making agent is required to pre-
serve its decisions under the growth of inputs. The
following proposition shows that ER(T ) is monotonic.
Proposition 2 We have R(T ) ⊆ R(T ∪ T ′) and
ER(T ) ⊆ ER(T ∪ T ′).
Monotonicity is illustrated by the following example.
Example 1 Let R = {⊤ ⇒ p, a ⇒ ¬p} and T =
{a}, where ⊤ stands for any tautology like p∨¬p. We
have ER(∅) = {p} and ER(T ) = {a, p,¬p}, i.e. the R
extension of T is inconsistent.
Of course, allowing inconsistent decisions may not be
intuitive. We are here concerned about possible de-
cisions rather than reasonable or feasible decisions.
Later we will define reasonable or feasible decisions
by excluding inconsistent decisions.
2.2 Agent system specification
An agent system specification given in Definition 2
contains a set of agents and for each agent a descrip-
tion of its decision problem. The agent’s decision prob-
lem is defined in terms of its beliefs and desires, which
are considered as defeasible belief and desire rules, a
priority ordering on the desire rules, as well as a set
of facts and an initial decision (or prior intentions).
We assume that agents are autonomous, in the sense
that there are no priorities between desires of distinct
agents.
Definition 2 (Agent system specification)
An agent system specification is a tuple
AS = 〈S, F,B,D,≥, δ0〉 that contains a set of
agents S, and for each agent i a finite set of facts
Fi ⊆ LW (F =
⋃n
i=1 Fi), a finite set of belief rules
Bi ⊆ LAW × LW (B =
⋃n
i=1 Bi), a finite set of
desire rules Di ⊆ LAW × LAW (D =
⋃n
i=1Di), a
relation ≥i⊆ Di ×Di (≥=
⋃n
i=1 ≥i) which is a total
ordering (i.e. reflexive, transitive, and antisymmetric
and for any two elements d1 and d2 in Di, either
d1 ≥i d2 or d2 ≥i d1), and a finite initial decision
δ0i ⊆ LA (δ
0 =
⋃n
i=1 δ
0
i ). For an agent i ∈ S we write
x⇒i y for one of its rules.
A belief rule ‘the agent αi believes y in context x’ is
an ordered pair x ⇒i y with x ∈ LAW and y ∈ LW ,
and a desire rule ‘the agent desires y in context x’ is
an ordered pair x ⇒i y with x ∈ LAW and y ∈ LAW .
It implies that the agent’s beliefs are about the world
(x ⇒i p), and not about the agent’s decisions. These
beliefs can be about the effects of decisions made by
the agent (a⇒i p) as well as beliefs about the effects of
parameters set by the world (p ⇒i q). Moreover, the
agent’s desires can be about the world (x⇒i p, desire-
to-be), but also about the agent’s decisions (x ⇒i a,
desire-to-do). These desires can be triggered by pa-
rameters set by the world (p⇒i y) as well as by deci-
sions made by the agent (a ⇒i y). Modelling mental
attitudes such as beliefs and desires in terms of defea-
sible rules results in what might be called conditional
mental attitudes [4].
2.3 Agent Decisions
The belief rules are used to determine the expected
consequences of a decision, where a decision δ is any
subset of LA that contains the initial decision δ
0. The
set of expected consequences of this decision δ is the
belief extension of F ∪ δ. Moreover, we consider a
feasible decision as a decision that does not imply a
contradiction.
Definition 3 (Decisions) Let AS =
〈{α1, . . . , αn}, F,B,D,≥, δ0〉 be an agent system
specification. An AS decision profile δ for agents α1,
. . . , αn is δ = 〈δ1, . . . δn〉 where δi is a decision of
agent αi such that
δ0i ⊆ δi ⊆ LAi for i = 1 . . . n
A feasible decision for agent i is δi such that
EBi(Fi ∪ δi) is consistent
A feasible decision profile is a decision profile such that
EB(F ∪ δ) is consistent
where we write EB(F ∪ δ) for
⋃n
i=1 EBi(Fi ∪ δi).
The following example illustrates the decisions of a
single agent.
Example 2 Let A1 = {a, b, c, d, e}, W = {p, q} and
AS = 〈{α1}, F,B,D,≥, δ
0〉 with F1 = {¬p}, B1 =
{c ⇒ q, d ⇒ q, e ⇒ ¬q}, D1 = {⊤ ⇒ a,⊤ ⇒ b, b ⇒
p,⊤ ⇒ q, d ⇒ q}, ≥1= {b ⇒ p > ⊤ ⇒ b}, and
δ01 = {a}. The initial decision δ
0
1 reflects that the agent
has already decided in an earlier stage to reach the
desire ⊤ ⇒ a. Note that the consequents of all B1
rules are sentences of LW , whereas the antecedents of
the B1 rules as well as the antecedents and consequents
of the D1 rules are sentences of LAW . We have due
to the definition of ER(S):
EB(F ∪ {a}) = {¬p, a}
EB(F ∪ {a, b}) = {¬p, a, b}
EB(F ∪ {a, c}) = {¬p, a, c, q}
EB(F ∪ {a, d}) = {¬p, a, d, q}
EB(F ∪ {a, e}) = {¬p, a, e,¬q}
. . .
EB(F ∪ {a, d, e}) = {¬p, a, d, e, q,¬q}
. . .
Therefore {a, d, e} is not a feasible AS decision profile,
because its belief extension is inconsistent. Continued
in Example 4.
The following example illustrates that the set of feasi-
ble decisions of an agent may depend on the decisions
of other agents.
Example 3 Let A1 = {a}, A2 = {b}, W = {p} and
AS = 〈{α1, α2}, F,B,D,≥, δ0〉 with F1 = F2 = ∅,
B1 = {a⇒ p}, B2 = {b⇒ ¬p}, D1 = {⊤ ⇒ p}, D2 =
{⊤ ⇒ ¬p}, ≥ is the identity relation, and δ01 = δ
0
2 = ∅.
We have that 〈∅, {b}〉 is a feasible decision profile, but
〈{a}, {b}〉 is not. If δ1 = ∅, then agent α2 can decide
δ2 = {b}. However, if δ1 = {a}, then agent α2 cannot
decide so, i.e. δ2 6= {b}.
2.4 Agent preferences
In this section we introduce a way to compare deci-
sions. We compare decisions by comparing sets of de-
sire rules that are not reached by the decisions. Since
only ordering on individual desire rules, and not or-
dering on sets of desire rules, are given, we first lift
the ordering on individual desire rules to an ordering
on sets of desire rules.
Definition 4 Let AS = 〈S, F,B,D,≥, δ0〉 be an
agent system specification, D′i, D
′′
i two subsets of Di,
and Di \D′i the set of Di elements which are not D
′
i
elements. We have D′i  D
′′
i if ∀d
′′ ∈ D′′i \ D
′
i∃d
′ ∈
D′i \ D
′′
i such that d
′ > d′′. We write D′i ≻ D
′′
i if
D′i  D
′′
i and D
′′
i 6 D
′
i, and we write D
′
i ≃ D
′′
i if
D′i  D
′′
i and D
′′
i  D
′
i.
The following propositions show that the priority re-
lation  is reflexive, anti-symmetric, and transitive.
Proposition 3 Let D1 6⊆ D3 and D3 6⊆ D1. For fi-
nite sets, the relation  is reflexive ( ∀D D  D),
anti-symmetric ∀D1, D2 (D1  D2 ∧ D2  D1) →
D1 = D2, and transitive, i.e. D1  D2 and D2  D3
implies D1  D3.
The desire rules are used to compare the decisions.
The comparison is based on the set of unreached de-
sires and not on the set of violated or reached desires.
A desire x ⇒ y is unreached by a decision if the ex-
pected consequences of this decision imply x but not
y. The desire rule is violated or reached if these conse-
quences imply respectively x∧¬y or x∧y, respectively.
Definition 5 (Comparing decisions) Let
AS = 〈S, F,B,D,≥, δ0〉 be an agent system specifica-
tion and δ be a AS decision. The unreached desires
of decision δ for agent αi are:
Ui(δ) =
{x⇒ y ∈ Di | EB(F ∪ δ) |= x and EB(F ∪ δ) 6|= y}
Decision δ is at least as good as decision δ′ for
agent αi, written as δ ≥
U
i δ
′, iff
Ui(δ
′)  Ui(δ)
Decision δ dominates decision δ′ for agent αi, written
as δ >Ui δ
′, iff
δ ≥Ui δ
′ and δ′ 6≥Ui δ
The following continuation of Example 2 illustrates the
comparison of decisions.
Example 4 (Continued) We have:
U({a}) = {⊤ ⇒ b,⊤ ⇒ q},
U({a, b}) = {b⇒ p,⊤ ⇒ q},
U({a, c}) = {⊤ ⇒ q},
U({a, d}) = {⊤ ⇒ b, d⇒ q},
U({a, e}) = {⊤ ⇒ b,⊤ ⇒ q},
U({a, b, c}) = {b⇒ p}.
. . .
We thus have for example that the decision {a, c} dom-
inates the initial decision {a}, i.e. {a, c} >U {a}.
There are two decisions for which their set of un-
reached contains only one desire. Due to the priority
relation, we have that {a, c} >U {a, b, c}.
2.5 Agent games
In this subsection, we consider agents interactions
based on agent system specifications, their correspond-
ing agent decisions, and the ordering on the decisions
as explained in previous subsections. Game theory is
the usual tool to model the interaction between self-
interested agents. Agents select optimal decisions un-
der the assumption that other agents do likewise. This
makes the definition of an optimal decision circular,
and game theory therefore restricts its attention to
equilibria. For example, a decision is a Nash equilib-
rium if no agent can reach a better (local) decision by
changing its own decision. The most used concepts
from game theory are Pareto efficient decisions, dom-
inant decisions and Nash decisions. We first repeat
some standard notations from game theory [1, 9].
As mentioned, we use δi to denote a decision of agent
αi and δ = 〈δ1, . . . , δn〉 to denote a decision profile con-
taining one decision for each agent. δ−i is the decision
profile of all agents except the decision of agent αi.
(δ−i, δ
′
i) denotes a decision profile which is the same
as δ except that the decision of agent i from δ is re-
placed with the decision of agent i from δ′. δ′i >
U
i δi
denotes that decision δ′i is better than δi according to
his preferences >Ui and δ
′
i ≥
U
i δi if better or equal. ∆
is the set of all decision profiles for agents α1, . . . , αn,
∆f ⊆ ∆ is the set of feasible decision profiles, and ∆i
is the set of possible decisions for agent αi.
Definition 6 (Game specification) Let
AS = 〈S = {α1, . . . , αn}, F,B,D,≥, δ0〉 be spec-
ification of agent system in S, Ai be the set of AS
feasible decisions of agent αi according to Definition
3, ∆f = A1 × . . .×An, and ≥Ui be the AS preference
relation of agent αi defined on its feasible decisions
according to definition 5. Then, the game specification
of AS is the tuple 〈S,∆f , (≥
U
i )〉.
We now consider different types of decision profiles
which are similar to types of strategy profiles from
game theory.
Definition 7 A PS decision profile δ = 〈δ1, . . . , δn〉 ∈
∆f is:
Pareto decision if there is no δ′ = 〈δ′1, . . . , δ
′
n〉 ∈ ∆f
for which δ′i >
U
i δi for all agents αi.
strongly Pareto decision if there is no δ′ =
〈δ′1, . . . , δ
′
n〉 ∈ ∆f for which δ
′
i ≥
U
i δi for all agents
αi and δ
′
j >
U δj for some agents αj.
dominant decision if for all δ′ ∈ ∆f and for every
agent i it holds: (δ′−i, δi) ≥
U
i (δ
′
−i, δ
′
i) i.e. a deci-
sion is dominant if it yields a better payoff than
any other decisions regardless of what the other
agents decide.
Nash decision if for all agents i it holds:
(δ−i, δi) ≥Ui (δ−i, δ
′
i) for all δ
′
i ∈ ∆
i
f
It is a well known fact that Pareto decisions exist (for
finite games), whereas dominant decisions do not have
to exist. The latter is illustrated by the following ex-
ample.
Example 5 Let α1 and α2 be two agents,
F1 = F2 = ∅, and initial decisions δ01 = δ
0
2 = ∅.
They have the following beliefs en desires:
Bα1 = {a⇒ p,¬a⇒ ¬p}
Dα1 = {⊤ ⇒ p,⊤ ⇒ q}
≥α1= ⊤ ⇒ p > ⊤ ⇒ q > ⊤ ⇒ ¬q > ⊤ ⇒ ¬p
Bα2 = {b⇒ q,¬b⇒ ¬q}
Dα2 = {⊤ ⇒ ¬p,⊤ ⇒ ¬q}
≥α2= ⊤ ⇒ ¬p > ⊤ ⇒ ¬q > ⊤ ⇒ q > ⊤ ⇒ p
Let ∆f be feasible decision profiles, EB be the
outcomes of the decisions, and U(δi) be the set of
unreached desires for agent αi.
∆ EB Uδ1 Uδ2
〈a, b〉 {p, q} ∅ {⊤ ⇒ ¬p,
⊤ ⇒ ¬q}
〈a,¬b〉 {p,−q} {⊤ ⇒ q} {⊤ ⇒ ¬p}
〈¬a, b〉 {¬p, q} {⊤ ⇒ p} {⊤ ⇒ ¬q}
〈¬a,¬b〉 {¬p,¬q} {⊤ ⇒ p,⊤ ⇒ q} ∅
According to definition 5, for A1 :
U(〈a, b〉) > U(〈a,¬b〉) > U(〈¬a, b〉) > U(〈¬a,¬b〉)
and for A2 :
U(〈¬a,¬b〉) > U(〈¬a, b〉) > U(〈a,¬b〉) > U(〈a, b〉).
None of these decision profiles are dominant decisions,
i.e. the agents specifications has no dominant solution
with respect to their unreached desires.
The following example illustrates a typical cooperation
game.
Example 6 B1 = {a⇒ p , b⇒ ¬p∧ q}, D1 = {⊤ ⇒
p∧ q} B2 = {c⇒ q , d⇒ p∧ ¬q} D2 = {⊤ ⇒ p∧ q}.
The agents have a common goal p ∧ q, which they can
only reach by cooperation.
The following example illustrates a qualitative version
of the notorious prisoner’s dilemma, where the self-
ish behavior of individual autonomous agents leads to
global bad decisions.
Example 7 Let A1 = {a} (α1 cooperates), A2 = {b}
(α2 cooperates), and AS be an agent system specifica-
tion with D1 = {⊤ ⇒ ¬a ∧ b,⊤ ⇒ b,⊤ ⇒ ¬(a ∧ ¬b)},
D2 = {⊤ ⇒ a ∧ ¬b,⊤ ⇒ a,⊤ ⇒ ¬(¬a ∧ b)}. The only
Nash decision is {¬a,¬b}, whereas both agents would
prefer {a, b}.
Starting from an agent system specification, we can
derive the game specification and in this game specifi-
cation we can use standard techniques to for example
find the Pareto decisions. However, the problem with
this approach is that the translation from an agent
system specification to a game specification is compu-
tationally expensive. For example, a compact agent
representation with only a few belief and desire rules
may lead to a huge set of decisions if the number of
decision variables is high.
The main challenge of qualitative game theory is there-
fore whether we can bypass the translation to game
specification, and define properties directly on the
agent system specification. For example, are there
particular properties of agent system specification for
which we can prove that there always exists a domi-
nant decision for its corresponding derived game spec-
ification? A simple example is an agent system spec-
ification in which each agent has the same belief and
desire rules.
In this paper we do not further pursue these issues,
but we turn to our focus of interest: joint goals.
3 Joint goals
In this section we ask ourselves the question whether
and how we can interpret a decision profile or equilib-
rium as goal-based or goal-oriented behavior. We first
define decision rules and sets of decision profiles closed
under indistinguishable decision profiles.
3.1 Decision rule
A decision rule maps a agent system specification to a
set of possible decision profiles.
Definition 8 A decision rule is a function from agent
system specifications to sets of feasible decision pro-
files.
Decision theory prescribes a decision maker to select
the optimal or best decision, which can be defined as a
decision that is not dominated. Is there an analogous
prescription for societies of agents? A set of cooperat-
ing agents has to select an optimal or Pareto decision.
We call such cooperating agents a BD rational society
of cooperating agents.
Definition 9 A BD rational society of cooperating
agents is a set of agents, defined by an agent system
specification AS, that selects a Pareto AS decision.
In this paper we consider decision rules based on un-
reached desires. We therefore assume that a decision
rule cannot distinguish between decision profiles δ1
and δ2 such that δ1 ∼U δ2. We say that two decision
profiles δ and δ′ are indistinguishable if U(δ) = U(δ′),
and we call a set of decisions U-closed if the set is
closed under indistinguishable decision profiles.
Definition 10 Let AS = 〈S, F,B,D,≥, δ0〉 be an
agent system specification and ∆ a set of AS decision
profiles. ∆ is U-closed if δ ∈ ∆ implies δ′ ∈ ∆ for all
AS decision profiles δ′ such that U(δ) = U(δ′).
An example of a decision rule is the function that maps
agent system specifications to Pareto decision profiles
(a BD rational decision rule). Another example is a
function that maps agent system specifications to Nash
equilibria if they exist, otherwise to Pareto decisions.
3.2 Goals
In this section we show that every society of agents
can be understood as planning for joint goals, whether
the decision is reached by cooperation or is given by
a (e.g. Nash) equilibrium. We define not only goals
which must be reached, called positive goals, but we
add negative goals. Negative goals are defined in the
following definition as states the agent has to avoid.
They function as constraints on the search process of
goal-based decisions.
Definition 11 (Goal-based decision) Let AS =
〈S, F,B,D,≥, δ0〉 be an agent system specification,
and the so-called positive joint goal set G+ and the
negative joint goal set G− be subsets of LAW . A deci-
sion δ is a 〈G+, G−〉 decision if EB(F ∪ δ) |=AW G
+
and for each g ∈ G− we have EB(F ∪ δ) 6|=AW g.
Joint goals are defined with respect to a set of decision
profiles. The definition of ∆ joint goal set encodes
a decision profile together with its indistinguishable
decision profiles as a positive and negative goal set.
Definition 12 (∆ goal set) Let AS =
〈S, F,B,D,≥, δ0〉 be an agent system specifica-
tion and ∆ an U-closed set of feasible decisions. The
two sets of formulas 〈G+, G−〉 ⊆ (LAW , LAW ) is a ∆
joint goal set of AS if there is an AS decision δ ∈ ∆
such that
G+ = {y | x⇒ y ∈ D,EB(F ∪ δ) |=AW x ∧ y}
G− = {x | x⇒ y ∈ D,EB(F ∪ d) 6|=AW x}
〈G+, G−〉 ⊆ (LAW , LAW ) is a feasible joint goal set of
AS if there is an U-closed set of feasible decisions ∆
such that 〈G+, G−〉 ⊆ (LAW , LAW ) is a ∆ joint goal
set of AS. 〈G+, G−〉 ⊆ (LAW , LAW ) is a joint goal set
of AS if there is a set D′ ⊆ D such that
G+ = {y | x⇒ y ∈ D′}
G− = {x | x⇒ y ∈ D′}
The first part of the representation theorem follows
directly from the definitions.
Proposition 4 Let AS = 〈S, F,B,D,≥, δ0〉 be an
agent system specification and ∆ be an U-closed set of
feasible decision profiles. For a decision profile δ ∈ ∆
of AS there is a ∆ joint goal set 〈G+, G−〉 of AS such
that δ is a 〈G+, G−〉 decision.
Proof. Follows directly from the definitions.
Proposition 5 Let AS = 〈S, F,B,D,≥, δ0〉 be an
agent system specification and ∆ an U-closed set of
feasible decision profiles. For a ∆ joint goal set
〈G+, G−〉 of AS, a 〈G+, G−〉 decision is a ∆ decision.
Proof. Follows from U-closed property.
The representation theorem is a combination of Propo-
sition 4 and 5.
Theorem 1 Let AS = 〈S, F,B,D,≥, δ0〉 be an agent
system specification and ∆ an U-closed set of feasible
decision profiles. A decision profile δ is in ∆ if and
only if there is a ∆ goal set 〈G+, G−〉 of AS such that
δ is a 〈G+, G−〉 decision profile.
The second theorem follows from the first one.
Theorem 2 Let AS = 〈S, F,B,D,≥, δ0〉 be an agent
system specification. A decision profile δ is a feasible
AS decision profile if and only if there is a feasible goal
set 〈G+, G−〉 of AS such that δ is a 〈G+, G−〉 decision
profile.
Consider a society of agent that tries to determine its
Pareto decision profiles. The game specifications sug-
gest the following algorithm:
calculate all decision profiles
for all decision profiles,
calculate consequences
order all decision profiles
The goal-based representation suggest an alternative
approach:
calculate all joint goals
filter feasible joint goals
for each feasible joint goal set
find goal-based decision profiles
order these decision profiles
In other words, the goal-based representation suggests
to calculate the joint goals first. However, the problem
to calculate these joint goals is still computationally
hard. There are two ways to proceed:
• Define heuristics for the optimization problem;
• Find a fragment of the logic, such that the opti-
mization becomes easier.
For example, consider the following procedure to find
(positive) goals:
G ⊆ EB∪D(F ∪ δ
0)
This procedure is not complete, because it does not
take effects of actions into account. Thus, in the gen-
eral case it can be used as a heuristic. Moreover, it is
complete for the fragment in which the belief rules do
not contain effects of actions, i.e. B ⊆ S×LW ×LW .1
4 Concluding remarks
In this paper we have defined a qualitative decision
and game theory in the spirit of classical decision and
game theory. The theory illustrates the micro-macro
dichotomy by distinguishing the optimization problem
from game theoretic equilibria. We also showed that
any group decision, whether based on optimization or
on an equilibrium, can be represented by positive and
negative goals.
We think that the method of this paper is more inter-
esting than its formal results. The decision and game
theory are based on several ad hoc choices which need
further investigation. For example, the desire rules are
defeasible but the belief rules are not (the obvious ex-
tension leads to wishful thinking problems as studied
in [14, 3]). However, the results suggest that any group
decision can be understood as reaching for goals. We
hope that further investigations along this line brings
the theories and tools used for individual agents and
multi agent systems closer together.
1We cannot add beliefs on decision variables, as will be
clear in the next section. Suppose A = {a} and B = {⊤ →
a}. Clearly all decisions should be considered. However,
all decision profiles given in Definition 3 imply a and thus
all decisions not implying a would be excluded.
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